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CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY WORKS IN WAY'S IN CUBA

A-9

November 1: Despite attempts to whip up patriotic spirits, the big majority is less than half won but this does not mean that the army would not fight.

Description of normal life of business and industry, extra staff and militia duties must lower morale of doubters and unbelievers.

VOA factual programs are just right at this moment for this new hungry public. Result of radio inquiries during the last three days fully supports bottom line that medium wave is most important channel.

November 1: Following is summary of conversations between [] A-9
Commissioner Hungarian Embassy Havana and Commissioner of British Embassy

She said that she was convinced that the Cubans did not understand the issues involved in the present crisis. They regarded it as a purely Cuban affair and did not understand diplomatic significance of missile sites nor the risk of nuclear war. It was vital that they should be persuaded not to upset the chance of an agreement between the Americans and the Russians. She hoped Khrushchev would achieve this. It would be better for Castro not to make his important speech before he had spoken to Khrushchev.

A-9

She did not discount when [] said that the Cuban press had made it difficult for the people to understand issues, since they withheld the full facts. She came close to admitting that the Russians had made a mistake in building missile sites in Cuba, but said that it was natural that they should respond to neighbors bases close to their territory.

It is perhaps possible that this unusual expression indicated intention of a Soviet attempt to convince the West that they are not responsible for difficulties which the Cubans are now making.

A-9

November 2: Cuban regime has taken position that Cuba has not been abandoned by USSR and Khrushchev has come to discuss further assistance rather than to pressure Cuba submit to UN inspection. Regime has taken special pains to present this view to [] Presently impossible to anticipate Castro reactions, internal and external, but he could not violently in either area.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A7/CAC/MR

3/3/68

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REVIEWED by fitzgerald DATE 3/3/68
() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() EXCISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
(X) DENY () Non-responsive info.
FOIA, EO or PA exemptions 6/6/ TS authority to: None

() CLASSIFY

a9

November 26 [redacted] - 2 - a-9
stated to
Department official that Castro's days are numbered irrespective of how
well and the torture was and this because he has demonstrated to the
world he was a spy in a Soviet state. [redacted] believes [redacted] believes [redacted]
was trying Castro to blurb with a threat to stop all Soviet assistance. 99

11-6-68

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WASHINGTON EMBASSY REPORTS RE EVENTS IN CUBA

November 1: Despite attempts to whip up patriotic spirits, the big majority is less than luke warm but this does not mean that the Army would not fight.

Disruption of normal life of business and industry, extra staff and militia duties must lower morale of doubters and unbelievers.

VOA factual programs are just right at this moment for this news hungry public. Result of wide inquiries during the last three days fully supports belief [] that medium wave is most important channel.

November 1: Following is summary of conversation between [] Counsellor Hungarian Embassy Havana and Counsellor of British Embassy []

She said that she was convinced that the Cubans did not understand the issue involved in the present crisis. They regarded it as a purely Cuban affair and did not understand diplomatic significance of missile sites nor the risk of nuclear war. It was vital that they should be persuaded not to upset the chance of an agreement between the Americans and the Russians. She hoped Mikoyan would achieve this. It would be better for Castro not to make his important speech before he had spoken to Mikoyan.

She did not dissent when [] said that the Cuban press had made it difficult for the people to understand issues, since they withheld the full facts. She came close to admitting that the Russians had made a mistake in building missile sites in Cuba, but said that it was natural that they should respond to American bases close to their territory.

It is perhaps possible that this unusual approach indicated intentions of a Soviet attempt to convince the West that they are not responsible for difficulties which the Cubans are now making. []

November 2: Cuban regime has taken position that Cuba has not been abandoned by USSR and Mikoyan has come to discuss further assistance rather than to pressure Cuba submit to UN inspection. Regime has taken special pains to present this view to [] Presently impossible to anticipate Castro reactions, internal and external, but he could act violently in either area.

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November 2: [] stated to Department officer that Castro's days are numbered irrespective of how much aid the Soviets now give him because he has demonstrated to the world he was a puppet in a Soviet show. [] believe Mikoyan can bring Castro to heel with a threat to stop all Soviet assistance.

ARA: [illegible] R.T. Follestad/[illegible]
11-6-62